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Audit the Federal Reserve? 
by William A. Barnett 
Abstract:  An independent institute for monetary statistics is needed in the United 
States, says William Barnett. Expanded Congressional audit would be a second 
best alternative, but would not fully address the needs and would carry risks. 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has spoken out against Congressional 
bills to audit the Federal Reserve.  Why?  Proponents argue that the purpose of the 
audits is to increase the transparency of Federal Reserve policy and improve the 
quality of data from the Federal Reserve.  Aren’t these both in the public interest?  
There is growing evidence that defective Federal Reserve data played a role in 
producing the misperceptions of systemic risk that led up to the current recession.  
In the popular media, it has become fashionable to blame banks and Wall Street for 
having irrationally taken excessive risk out of “greed.”  But banks and Wall Street 
firms believed that increased investment risk was prudent, as a result of the widely 
held view that systemic risk had decreased permanently.  Even Nobel Laureate 
Robert Lucas had written in his Presidential Address to the American Economic 
Association that the Federal Reserve had gotten so good at its job that 
macroeconomists should cease research on countercyclical policy and re-focus 
their research solely on long term economic growth.1  But as I have shown in my 
research, better Federal Reserve data would have revealed that Federal Reserve 
policy had not greatly improved, and hence the widespread confidence in the 
“Greenspan Put” and the permanent end of the business cycle was misguided.2 
A recent Rasmussen-reports survey found that 75% of Americans favor auditing 
the Federal Reserve and making the results available to the public, while only 9% 
oppose it, with 15% being unsure.  After all, as a previous New York Federal 
Reserve Bank President remarked, the Fed is independent within the federal 
government, not of the federal government.3 Since the Federal Reserve was created 
                                                          
1 Robert Lucas (2003), “Macroeconomic Priorities,” American Economic Review, vol. 93,  no. 1, pp. 1-14.  
2 See William A. Barnett and Marcelle Chauvet, “How Better Monetary Statistics Could Have Signaled the Financial 
Crisis,” Journal of Econometrics, forthcoming; and William A. Barnett, Getting It Wrong: How Faulty Monetary 
Statistics Undermine the Fed, MIT Press, forthcoming. 
3 The statement was by Federal Reserve Bank President Allan Sproul in an April 1952 hearing before the Joint 
Economic Committee of Congress. 
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by Congress, the Fed is inherently accountable to Congress. Isn’t, therefore, an 
audit in the interests of good government? 
The current debate needs to be set against the background of long-running tensions 
between the central bank, legislative and executive branches of government.  
When, in 1978, Congress passed a bill mandating audits by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) (then, the General Accounting Office) for most 
government agencies, the bill excluded from audit a vast sweep of the Federal 
Reserve System’s activities.  However, operations of some Federal Reserve 
activities, including monetary policy, were addressed in the same year in the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act.   The following year, Chairman Paul Volcker made 
major policy changes to lower the inflation rate.  Bernanke has stated that the 1978 
audit exclusions were necessary to allow Chairman Volcker’s ability to act 
decisively.  Personally, I doubt this.  I was on the staff of the Federal Reserve 
Board in Washington, DC at that time.  Paul Volcker was a determined chairman, 
whose actions were based upon his own strong convictions.  Since the GAO has no 
policy-making authority, the GAO could not have prevented him from 
implementing his chosen policy.   
Certainly, the Federal Reserve has some strong arguments. The biggest danger, of 
course, is that the granting of increased audit authority to Congress would allow 
politicians to second-guess unpopular policy actions. However, audit authority is 
hardly necessary for them to poke their noses into the Fed’s business, as has been 
demonstrated time and again by the actions of past Congressmen, Senators, and 
Presidents.  In fact, from its point of view, Congress created the Federal Reserve 
and thereby has the responsibility for oversight of what it created. 
There are well-known examples of such pressures. When I had lunch with Arthur 
Burns, following his term as Federal Reserve Chairman (1970-78),   I asked him 
whether any of his decisions had ever been influenced by Congressional pressure.  
He emphatically said no --- not ever.  On the other hand, Milton Friedman, 
reported that Nixon himself believed he had influenced Burns.4  Similarly, Fed 
Chairman William M. Martin (1951-70) discussed pressures from President 
                                                          
4 William A. Barnett and Paul Samuelson (2007), Inside the Economist’s Mind, Wiley/Blackwell, Malden, MA, p. 116.  
Also see Burton A. Abrams (2006), "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes," 
Journal of Econ Perspectives, Fall 2006, pp. 177-188. 
3 
 
Lyndon Johnson.5  Chairman Martin emphasized that, in his views, the Congress 
and the President set the nation’s economic priorities, including spending, taxes, 
and borrowing.  The role of the Federal Reserve, in Martin’s view, was to assist in 
fulfilling those policies, including facilitating Treasury borrowing at reasonable 
interest rates.  In 1966, when he led a sharp contraction of monetary policy to 
offset aggregate demand pressures from President Johnson’s policies, Martin was 
sharply reprimanded by President Johnson.  In 1969 the FOMC did respond 
unwisely to administration pressures to ease policy (Meltzer, forthcoming). 
Occasionally, presidents have been supportive. President Reagan’s support was 
important to the success of Chairman Volcker’s anti-inflation policy.  None of the 
above dramatic moves had anything to do with Federal Reserve accountability to 
Congress.  
Perhaps the closest antecedent to current Congressional audit proposals was the 
upswell of monetarist sentiment in the Congress in 1975-8 following puzzling 
phenomena in money markets in 1974.  Later analysis revealed flaws in the 
published monetary aggregates data during that period.  Those flaws contaminated 
economic research for years afterwards and remain a source of misunderstanding 
to the present day.6  Two Congressional measures—House Concurrent Resolution 
133 in 1975 and the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978—subsequently required that 
the Fed chairman appear twice each year before Congress to report the FOMC’s 
target ranges for money growth (if any had been set).7  The Federal Reserve 
bristled under such supervision.  Never before in the Fed’s history had the 
Congress imposed a reporting requirement on Fed policymakers—and a 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Robert P. Bremmer (2004), Chairman of the Fed: William McChesney Martin and the Creation of the 
Modern American Financial System, Yale Univ Press. 
6 The bad data produced extensive confusion in academic research and led to the erroneous belief that the 
demand for and supply of money had, without reason, mysteriously shifted in 1974 and were unstable.  But the 
seemingly unexplainable economic structural shifts were shown to disappear, when the data flaws were corrected.  
See William A. Barnett, Edward K. Offenbacher, and Paul A. Spindt (1984), “The New Divisia Monetary Aggregates,” 
Journal of Political Economy, vol 92, pp. 1049-1085.  Reprinted in William A. Barnett and Apostolos Serletis (2000), 
The Theory of Monetary Aggregation, Elsevier, Amsterdam, ch. 17. 
7 One widely held theory is that the Congressional actions were precipitated by overtightening by the Fed in 1974 
in response to faulty monetary data.   There is controversy about precisely what precipitated these Congressional 
actions.  See, e.g., William Poole, “Monetary Policy:  Eight Years of Progress?” Journal of Finance, vol 34, no 2, May 
1979, pp. 473-484.  But what is well established is that the structural shifts that the Fed and the profession 
believed occurred in 1974 did not occur and were inferred from defective data, as shown by Barnett, Offenbacher, 
and Spindt (1984). 
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requirement far less invasive than a GAO audit.  The Humphrey-Hawkins Act 
reporting requirement came up for renewal in 2003, but quietly was allowed to 
expire.  Semi-annual reports to the Congress continue, but without the force of law. 
There are several instances when faulty monetary data led policy makers astray. 
My research suggests that Volcker’s disinflationary policy (similar to 1974-5) was 
overdone and produced an unnecessarily severe recession.  Poor data on the 
monetary aggregates, having improperly weighted components, led Volcker 
inadvertently to decrease monetary growth to a rate that, appropriately measured, 
was half what he thought it was.8 Volcker wrote to me years later that he “still is 
suffering from an allergic reaction” to my findings about the actual monetary 
growth rate during that period.  Suppose a GAO audit had investigated whether the 
data being published were best-practice among monetary economists concerned 
with measuring monetary aggregates, and concluded that it was not.  Would 
Volcker have selected a more gradual disinflationary policy?  Perhaps.  Without 
unbiased external reviews of Federal Reserve measurement practices, we can never 
know—nor can we avoid the possibility of future mistakes.   
Focus, for a moment, on the Federal Reserve’s monetary published data.  Is its 
quality the best possible?  Are the items reported constructed appropriately to the 
task of operating and understanding the path of monetary policy?  Unfortunately, 
no.  Consider, for example, the important and widely monitored data on banks’ 
“nonborrowed reserves.”   Every analyst understands that banks hold reserves at 
the Federal Reserve to satisfy legal requirements and to settle interbank payments, 
such as wire transfers and check clearing. The total of such reserves may be 
partitioned into two parts:  the portion borrowed from the Federal Reserve and the 
portion that is not (non-borrowed).  Clearly (or so it would seem to most persons) 
the borrowed portion of reserves cannot exceed total reserves, so non-borrowed 
reserves cannot be negative.  Yet recent Federal-Reserve-reported values of non-
borrowed reserves were minus 50 billion dollars!  How can this happen?  In its 
definitions, the Federal Reserve chose to omit from “total reserves” large amounts 
of funds borrowed from the Fed and included in published figures for borrowed 
                                                          
8 William A. Barnett (1984), “Recent Monetary Policy and the Divisia Monetary Aggregates,” American Statistician, 
American Statistical Association, vol. 38, pp. 165-172.  Reprinted in William A. Barnett and Apostolos Serletis 
(2000), The Theory of Monetary Aggregation, Elsevier, Amsterdam, ch. 23. 
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reserves.  Those term auction borrowings should be included in both borrowed and 
total reserves or in neither, depending upon whether they are or are not held as 
reserves.  It is unlikely that such confusing accounting practices would survive 
scrutiny by an outside audit, assuming it were competently performed. 
There are other serious defects in the data currently published. According to 
Section 2a of the Federal Reserve Act, the Federal Reserve is mandated to 
“maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates commensurate 
with the economy’s long run potential….”   Neglecting these instructions, Federal 
Reserve policymakers have stated that monetary aggregates currently are 
unimportant to their decisions. Whatever the merits or otherwise of this attitude, 
external analysts and researchers continue to depend on monetary aggregate data to 
obtain an accurate picture of the stance of policy, and many other central banks 
throughout the world continue to report data on multiple monetary aggregates.9  
During the 30 years since the Congress excluded monetary policy from GAO 
audits and mandated reporting of money growth in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, 
two of the then four published monetary aggregates have been discontinued:   M1 
and M2 remain, but M3 and L do not.  In quiet times, perhaps this is of little 
importance, but these broad monetary aggregates and the underlying data detail 
have been greatly missed during the financial crisis.   
Further, the M1 aggregate is severely biased downwards.  Since 1994, banks have 
been permitted by the Federal Reserve to reclassify, for purposes of calculating 
legal reserve requirements, certain checking account balances as if they were 
MMDA saving deposits; banks supply to the Federal Reserve only the post-sweeps 
checking account (demand deposit) data.  The resulting published data on checking 
deposits understates, by approximately half, the amount of such deposits held by 
the public at banks. Why doesn’t the Federal Reserve require banks to report the 
complete data?  Does such published monetary data satisfy the requirement of the 
Federal Reserve Act?  Again, it seems unlikely that such an omission would 
survive an unconstrained audit by persons qualified in economic index number 
theory.   
                                                          
9 A particularly admirable example is the Bank of England, which includes among its officially published monetary 
aggregates a properly weighted broad M4 “Divisia” monetary aggregate, based on my research. 
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 Now we come to the bills currently under debate in the Senate and the 
House to expand upon GAO audit authority.  The House bill was introduced by 
Texas Republican Congressman Ron Paul and has 317 cosponsors, including over 
100 Democrats.  The Senate bill was introduced by Vermont Independent Senator 
Bernie Sanders; bipartisan co-sponsors include Kansas Republican Senator 
Brownback and Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russell Feingold.  In Washington, 
DC, I recently met with a Senator and his staff who support the Senate bill, and 
with a Federal Reserve Board Division Director, who opposes part of it.  Since my 
conversations in Washington were about the Senate bill, I shall comment on only 
that bill.   
Current law contains four audit exclusions for the Federal Reserve.  That Senate 
bill would remove all four of the current audit exclusions.  The four exclusions are: 
“(1) transactions for or with a foreign central bank, government of a 
foreign country, or nonprivate international financing organization;  
(2) deliberations, decisions, or actions on monetary policy matters, 
including discount window operations, reserves of member banks, 
securities credit, interest on deposits, and open market operations;  
(3) transactions made under the direction of the Federal Open Market 
Committee; or  
(4) a part of a discussion or communication among or between 
members of the Board of Governors and officers and employees of the 
Federal Reserve System related to clauses (1)–(3) of this subsection.“ 
Exclusions 1 and 3 are arguably not in the public interest and could be removed.  I 
do not support unconditional removal of the other two exclusions, because they 
appear to overlap roles that could be interpreted to be outside the GAO’s primary 
areas of expertise.  If those exclusions, 2 and 4, are nevertheless removed, I would 
favor their subsequent reintroduction in an amended form, focused more explicitly 
on aspects of the exclusions subject to relevant concern.    
Many economists have signed a “Petition for Fed Independence,” which is often 
interpreted as opposing audit of the Federal Reserve.  However, the petition makes 
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no mention of auditing the Federal Reserve.  The petition opposes possible 
infringements on Federal Reserve policy independence, and I support that view.  
Audits ask whether a firm or organization is following best-practice and existing 
regulations in its business dealings; they do not tell management how they should 
run a business or conduct policy.    
With respect to the collection and publication of accurate data, creation of an 
independent data institute for monetary and financial data would be preferable to 
expanded audit, since such institutes possess specialized expertise in economic 
measurement, including the latest advances in index number and aggregation 
theory.  There is an obvious potential for a conflict of interest in having data 
reported by the same agency that influences that data through its own policy 
actions.  Perhaps there is an economy of scale in such collection, but the risks 
outweigh any benefits.  
Expanded audit authority is only a reasonable “second best” alternative to an 
independent federal data institute.  Such separation is clear elsewhere in the 
government, with the Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and 
Bureau of Labor Statistics collecting data that later are used for policy purposes by 
the administration and the Congress.  An “independent” federal data institute need 
not be outside the Federal Reserve System.  Varying degrees of independence exist 
within the admirably decentralized Federal Reserve System, with, for example, 
regional bank presidents free to vote against the Federal Reserve Board’s positions 
at Federal Open Market Committee meetings in New York.  The deeply respected 
Bureau of Labor Statistics is within the Department of Labor, but has sole 
responsibility for production of Department of Labor data and employs a staff of 
formidable experts in economic aggregation and index number theory.  Expertise 
in those areas within the Federal Reserve System is minimal and is not centralized 
into any single group anywhere within the system.   
Regarding Federal Reserve independence, commentators’ concern should be 
focused on the recently renewed “coordination” of Federal Reserve monetary 
policy with the Treasury’s fiscal policy, which is in conflict with the 1951 
Treasury-Fed Accord that established independence of the Federal Reserve from 
the Treasury.   Unwise Federal Reserve actions in support of Treasury bond prices 
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during periods of heavy Treasury borrowing have ignited inflation twice before:  
once following World War II (a trend that ended with the 1951 Accord) and once 
following Chairman Martin’s capitulation to President Johnson’s Great Society 
pressures, as already mentioned.  
To conclude, Federal Reserve spokesmen are right to warn of the risks and 
dangers that expanded audit would entail. The best solution would be to set up an 
independent institute for monetary and financial data.  The Federal Reserve could 
create such an institute on its own within the Federal Reserve System, without the 
need for Congressional intervention.  Failing that, however, the potential risks 
entailed by an expanded audit role for Congress are outweighed by its potential 
benefits, since good reason exists to question the quality and quantity of economic 
data available from the Federal Reserve.  The cause of these inadequacies is the 
failure of the original design of the system to recognize the conflict of interests 
inherent in having a system with policy authority report the data that it itself 
influences.  However, it should be observed that expanded audit would be a much 
inferior solution to the creation of an independent data institute.  While the GAO 
has expertise in accounting, the GAO is not known for its expertise in economic 
aggregation and index number theory.  Those are the forms of expertise of greatest 
importance to any federal economic data institute, such as the excellent Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. 
Finally, and paradoxically, Senate audit bill critics frequently are advocates 
of Congressional imposition of an interest-rate (e.g., Taylor) or inflation-targeting 
policy-rule on the Federal Reserve, with heavy penalties for missing the target.  
Such a rule would constrain the Federal Reserve’s discretionary policy authority 
far more than any audit.  
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